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Abstract
The first highly pathogenic (HP) influenza A/H7N9 was reported in Guangdong in January 2017. To investigate the emer-
gence and spread of HP A/H7N9 in Guangdong province, we sequenced 297 viruses (58 HP A/H7N9, 19 low pathogenic (LP) A/
H7N9, and 220 A/H9N2) during 2016–2017. Our analysis showed that during the fifth wave, three A/H7N9 lineages were co-
circulating in Guangdong: the local LP Pearl River Delta (PRD) lineage (13%), the newly imported LP Yangtze River Delta
(YRD) lineage (23%), and the HP YRD lineage (64%). Previously circulating YRD-lineage LP during the third wave evolved to
the YRD-lineage HP A/H7N9 in Guangdong. All YRD-lineage LP detected during the fifth wave most likely originated from
newly imported viruses into Guangdong. Genotype comparison of HP A/H7N9 suggests limited outward spread of HP A/
H7N9 to other provinces. The distribution of HP A/H7N9 cleavage site variants on live poultry markets differed from that
found in humans, suggesting a V1-type cleavage site may facilitate human infections.
Key words: highly pathogenic influenza A/H7N9; genomic epidemiology; origins; Guangdong. .
1. Introduction
Since the first detection of low pathogenic (LP) A/H7N9 avian in-
fluenza in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region in China in
2013, five epidemic waves of human and poultry transmission
took place in China (Li et al. 2014). An important risk factor for
human A/H7N9 infection is a visit to a live poultry market (LPM)
(Liu et al. 2014; Yu et al. 2014). Control of the A/H7N9 epizootic
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has been challenging due to extensive live poultry trading and
absence of obvious clinical symptoms in infected birds
(Spackman et al. 2015; Zhou et al. 2015). In January 2017, the first
highly pathogenic (HP) A/H7N9 virus was identified in a patient
with confirmed exposure to dead poultry in Guangdong prov-
ince, China (Ke et al. 2017). Subsequently, similar viruses were
reported in poultry sampled at LPMs in Guangdong (Lu et al.
2018).
In response to the first emergence of HP A/H7N9 in
Guangdong province, we used data from our ongoing LPMs en-
vironmental surveillance program in the Guangdong province
to genetically trace the source of these HP A/H7N9 viruses. In
addition, we used genomic data to compare the molecular char-
acteristics of the A/H7N9 viruses in humans, poultry, and the
environment. We aim to have a thorough understanding of the
origin, spread, and transmission of this novel virus in
Guangdong province.
2. Material and methods
2.1 Influenza a surveillance at the live poultry markets
Influenza A surveillance was conducted at twenty-eight senti-
nel hospitals and LPMs in twenty-one prefecture-level cities in
Guangdong province during the fifth wave of the A/H7N9 out-
break (November 2016–August 2017). In order to trace the origin
of HP A/H7 in Guangdong, we retrospectively screened samples
of LPMs collected since January 2016. Environmental samples of
LPMs include swab specimens collecting from cages, chopping
boards, drinking water, and feather removal machines.
Additionally, oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were taken from
apparently healthy chickens, ducks, pigeons, francolins, geese,
and quails on LPMs. We collected samples at one retail market
and one wholesale market in each of twenty-one prefecture-
level cities. All samples were placed in viral transport medium
and stored at 80 C until further processing.
2.2 Screening and virus isolation
Samples were first tested for the presence of influenza A RNA
using real-time reverse transcription-PCR (rRT-PCR) assays tar-
geting the matrix protein, followed by rRT-PCR assays specifi-
cally targeting the A/H7 and A/H9 genes in twenty-one local
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and were fur-
ther verified by the Guangdong Provincial CDC as described pre-
viously (Ke et al. 2014). HP A/H7N9 was detected with rRT-PCR
amplification of a fragment of HA, as described previously (Jia
et al. 2017). Samples positive for A/H7 and A/H9 were treated by
antibiotics for 30 min and blindly passaged for two to three gen-
erations in 9- to 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs for virus
isolation. Allantoic fluid was collected 2 days after inoculation
and tested for the presence of virus by a hemagglutination test
using 1 per cent guinea pig erythrocytes or 0.5 per cent turkey
erythrocytes. Then positive subtypes of H7 and H9 were further
confirmed by rRT-PCR and processed for sequencing. In total,
251 HP and 70 LP A/H7N9 rRT-PCR positive samples were inocu-
lated, yielding 83 and 24 isolates, respectively. Of these, fifty-
eight and nineteenwere successfully sequenced. For A/H9N2 vi-
ruses, 863 positive samples were inoculated, yielding 360 iso-
lates, and 220 were successfully sequenced.
2.3 Genome sequencing
Viral RNA was extracted from allantoic fluid samples using the
QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany).
Extracted RNA was subjected to reverse transcription and am-
plification using the SuperScriptVR III One-Step RT-PCR system
(Thermo Fisher Waltham, USA). Genome sequencing of envi-
ronmental A/H7 and A/H9 viruses was performed on the next-
generation Ion PGM sequencing platform. Sequencing data were
analyzed with CLC Genomics Workbench 7.5.1 software. Low-
quality reads were trimmed using CLC trimmer with a quality
limit set at 0.05. Trimmed reads were then de novo assembled in
CLC using default parameters. Contigs with a coverage above 10
were extracted and annotated using a BLAST search against the
NCBI non-redundant nucleotide database (Benson et al. 2014).
The sequence with the highest nucleotide identity was down-
loaded as reference for read mapping. Consensus sequences for
all segments were extracted from the mapping results, with at
least 10 coverage depth at each site.
2.4 Epidemiological data
Information on live poultry imports from other regions of China
to Guangdong province was obtained from the local Ministry of
Agriculture. According to the geographic distribution of
twennty-nine Chinese provinces and cities, we classified them
into six regions. Provinces Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning,
Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Beijing city were grouped as north-
ern regions. Provinces Hubei, Hunan, and Henan were grouped
as central regions. Provinces Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi,
Shandong, Zhejiang, and the city of Shanghai were grouped as
eastern region. Hainan is considered the southern region. The
north-western region included provinces Gansu, Ningxia,
Qinghai, Shaanxi, Xinjiang and the south-western region in-
cluded provinces of Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Tibet, Yunnan,
and the city of Chongqing.
2.5 Phylogenetic analysis
Genome sequences from the present study were combined with
all publicly available sequences of influenza A/H7N9 (China)
and A/H9N2 (China) virus sequences available in GISAID and
part of A/H9N2 (China) from NCBI. The reference sequence ac-
cession numbers are summarized in Supplementary Table S3. A
total of 15,103 A/H7N9 sequences (HA¼ 1,989, NA¼ 2,173,
PB2¼ 1,779, PB1¼ 1,620, PA¼ 1,793, NP¼ 1,913, M¼ 2,027,
NS¼ 1,809) and 6950 A/H9N2 sequences (PB2¼ 1,159, PB1¼ 1,150,
PA¼ 1,162, NP¼ 1,151, M¼ 1,172, NS¼ 1,140) were downloaded
and analyzed. From the first to the fifth wave, a total of 1,371
complete genomes (1,301 of LP A/H7N9 and 70 of HP A/H7N9)
were available in GISAID. We only used sequence data with
known collection dates and sampling locations in our analyses.
Sequences were aligned in MUSCLE v3.5 with default settings
(Edgar 2004). The alignment was manually checked and cor-
rected in BioEdit (version 7.0.5.2). The amino acid sequences of
58 HP A/H7N9 and 19 LP A/H7N9 viruses were translated by
NCBI ORF Finder. Phylogenetic analysis was performed using
IQ-TREE (Nguyen et al. 2015), using maximum-likelihood phy-
logenies under the GTRþFþ IþG4 nucleotide substitution model
as the best predicted model. Clade nomenclature of eight seg-
ments was assigned as described previously (Lam et al. 2015).
We defined a novel genotype of A/H7N9 virus if one of eight seg-
ments belonged to a different clade. Clades were further divided
into sub-clades (1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, etc.) if at least three sequences
were available and the average intra-sub-clade genetic distance
was less than 3 per cent, as described previously (Lam et al.
2015).






/ve/article/6/2/veaa097/6041617 by guest on 11 February 2021
We estimated molecular clock phylogenies by using the
Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo approach implemented in
BEAST version 1.8. We computed four independent Markov
chain Monte Carlo runs of 1.5 108 steps for each alignment
and extracted a subset of 2,000 phylogenies from the posterior
tree distribution, subsequently used as an empirical tree distri-
bution for phylogeographic analyses. We computed maximum
clade credibility trees for each dataset by using TreeAnnotator.
We used the discrete phylogeographic method implemented in
BEAST to investigate spatial dynamics of H7N9 virus lineages
from seven regions in China. The seven regions were central
China (Jiangxi, Hunan, and Hubei), southern China
(Guangdong), Eastern China (Anhui, Jiangsu, Shandong, and
Zhejiang), Southwestern China (Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu,
Guangxi, and Guizhou), Northern China (Hebei, Henan,
Liaoning, and Jilin), Southeastern China (Fujian), Northwestern
China (Xinjiang, Shanxi, and Ningxia).
2.6 Analysis of genetic markers for risk assessment
Protein sequences of fifty-eight HP A/H7N9 viruses in this study
were compared with publicly available HP A/H7N9 sequences
using BioEdit. Biologically relevant amino acid substitutions on
protein HA, NA, NS1, M2, PA, PB1, and PB2 were compared as de-
scribed in previous studies (Jiao et al. 2008; Ping et al. 2010; Mok
et al. 2011, 2014; Tada et al. 2011; Song et al. 2014; Bi et al. 2015;
Xiao et al. 2016).
3. Results
3.1 Influenza a surveillance at the live poultry markets
During the study period, 34,106 environmental swabs were
tested, ranging from 572 to 3,790 per month during January
2016–August 2017 (Table 1). Surveillance data showed that
influenza A virus was detected in 7.4–29.4 per cent of the
monthly collected samples. A/H7 accounted for 1.0–36.8 per
cent of all avian influenza A viruses (Table 1). HP A/H7 was first
detected in environmental samples collected on 7 November
2016 in the city of Heyuan. Between November 2016 and August
2017, HP A/H7N9 viruses spread to LPMs in nineteen cities
(Fig. 1A and B). From November 2016 to August 2017, the propor-
tion of HP-positive samples accounted for 0.5–12 per cent of all
avian influenza A viruses. Approximately 25 per cent of all A/
H7N9-positive swabs were positive for HP A/H7 (Table 1). We se-
quenced the complete genomes of 58 HP H7N9, 19 LP H7N9, and
220 H9N2 viruses isolated from LPMs and poultry from
November 2016 to November 2017. These sequences have been
deposited into the GISAID database with accession numbers
listed in Supplementary Table S1.
3.2 Poultry trade
A total of 5.5 billion live birds were imported into Guangdong
from different areas of China including twenty-nine provinces
from the northwestern, southwestern, northern, central, east-
ern, and southern regions during the period January 2016–July
2018 (Supplementary Table S2). Specifically, live poultry from
the south-west, central, eastern, and south of China accounted
for 70 per cent of imported live poultry into Guangdong prov-
ince. Those regions included eleven provinces, which were
Yunnan (south-west), Sichuan (south-west), Guizhou (south-
west), Guangxi (south-west), Hunan (central), Henan (central),
Anhui (eastern), Shandong (eastern), Jiangsu (eastern), Zhejiang
(eastern), and Hainan (south) (Fig. 2A and B).
3.3 Analysis of a/H7N9 sequences
We compared the newly generated sequence data with all
Chinese A/H7N9 HP and LP full genomes available in public
Table 1. Environmental surveillance of avian influenza viruses and H7N9 influenza viruses in Guangdong province from January 2016 to
August 2017.
No. (%) of positive samples
Time No. of collected samples FluAþ/total H7N9/FluAþ HP H7N9/FluAþ LP H7N9/FluAþ
Jan 2016 2,523 743 (29.45) 50 (6.73) 0 (0) 50 (6.73)
Feb 2016 2,186 537 (24.57) 52 (9.68) 0 (0) 52 (9.68)
Mar 2016 2,203 611 (27.73) 84 (13.75) 0 (0) 84 (13.75)
Apr 2016 1,755 342 (19.49) 12 (3.51) 0 (0) 12 (3.51)
May 2016 1,867 430 (23.03) 17 (3.95) 0 (0) 17 (3.95)
June 2016 625 85 (13.6) 3 (3.53) 0 (0) 3 (3.53)
July 2016 596 105 (17.62) 2 (1.9) 0 (0) 2 (1.9)
Aug 2016 750 132 (17.6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Sept 2016 572 97 (16.96) 1 (1.03) 0 (0) 1 (1.03)
Oct 2016 712 99 (13.9) 4 (4.04) 0 (0) 4 (4.04)
Nov 2016 1,852 421 (22.73) 27 (6.41) 2 (0.48) 25 (5.94)
Dec 2016 2,590 686 (26.49) 206 (30.03) 38 (5.54) 168 (24.49)
Jan 2017 3,790 708 (18.68) 260 (36.72) 55 (7.77) 205 (28.95)
Feb 2017 3,341 672 (20.11) 247 (36.76) 48 (7.14) 199 (29.61)
Mar 2017 3,062 507 (16.56) 131 (25.84) 62 (12.23) 69 (13.61)
Apr 2017 1,910 355 (18.59) 101 (28.45) 32 (9.01) 69 (19.44)
May 2017 1,960 286 (14.59) 38 (13.29) 10 (3.5) 28 (9.79)
June 2017 599 55 (9.18) 12 (21.82) 3 (5.45) 9 (16.36)
July 2017 632 47 (7.44) 6 (12.77) 1 (2.13) 5 (10.64)
Aug 2017 581 90 (15.49) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total 34,106 7,008 (20.55) 1,253 (17.88) 251 (3.58) 1,002 (14.3)
FluAþ, type A avian influenza viruses; LP, low pathogenic; HP, highly pathogenic.
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Figure 1. Geographic spread and distribution of HP (A) and LP (B) A/H7N9 viruses on LPMs in twenty-one cities of Guangdong province from November 2016 to August
2017. Percentage represented the positive rate of HP and LP A/H7N9 in total avian influenza viruses by RT-PCR detection from November 2016 to August 2017.
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domains. A total of 57 out of 523 LP A/H7N9 sequences (includ-
ing 19 genomes from this study) were from Guangdong (11%),
260 (50%), 85 (16%), and 121 (23%) were from eastern, central,
and other regions of China, respectively. Of the 125 HP sequen-
ces (including 58 genomes from this study), 89 (71%) were col-
lected in Guangdong, 2 (2%) from eastern China, 5 (4%) from
central China, and 29 (23%) from other regions.
Based on the evolutionary analysis of H7N9 viruses since
first outbreak in 2013, the YRD region and the PRD region were
identified as the H7N9 outbreak source in China. A/H7N9 vi-
ruses are separated in the YRD-lineage and the Pearl River Delta
(PRD)-lineage LP A/H7N9 viruses (Lam et al. 2015). The YRD vi-
ruses have expanded and have been further subdivided in
clades and sub-clades, following nomenclature as described by
Lam et al. (2015) (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. S1). The A/H7N9 vi-
ruses of the fifth wave clustered into two major clades, desig-
nated as Clade B and C. All LP YRD-lineage A/H7N9 from the
fifth wave cluster into the C-2a, C-2b, and C-3 clades. HP YRD-
Figure 2. Live poultry import from different areas of China into Guangdong province. (A) Shows numbers (in millions) of live poultry were imported into Guangdong
from different areas of China including twenty-nine provinces from the northwestern, southwestern, northern, central, eastern, and southern regions during the pe-
riod from January 2016 to July 2018. (B) Shows 11 major provinces that accounted for 70 per cent of imported live poultry into Guangdong province from January 2016 to
July 2018.
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Figure 3. Phylogenetic analysis of the H7N9 influenza viruses. H7N9 viruses are divided into three clades (A, B, and C). Different colors of branches are indicated by dif-
ferent waves of H7N9 viruses. Viruses from different regions are highlighted by different colors. The surface and internal genes of different clade H7N9 influenza vi-
ruses are distinguished by different colored bars. All branch lengths are scaled according to the number of substitutions per site. Abbreviations of eight segments are
showed on the top of gene constellation bars: HA, haemagglutinin gene; NA, neuraminidase gene; 1, PB2 gene; 2, PB1 gene; 3, PA gene; 5, NP gene; 7, M gene; 8, NS gene.
The fifth wave PRD-lineage LP A/H7N9, YRD-lineage HPAI H7N9, and YRD-lineage LP A/H7N9 viruses are highlighted by the black bracketed lines. The previous YRD-lin-
eage LP A/H7N9 in Guangdong province is highlighted by a red arrow. The surface and internal genes of H7N9 viruses from the first wave to the fifth wave inside
Guangdong province are listed.
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Figure 4. Enlarged branch of phylogenetic analysis of HP A/H7N9 viruses during the fifth wave in Fig. 3. Different variants, regions, and clades of HP A/H7N9 viruses
were highlighted by different colors. Human HP A/H7N9 were labeled out by red dot in the tree. Abbreviations of eight segments are showed on the top of gene constel-
lation bars: HA, haemagglutinin gene; NA, neuraminidase gene; 1, PB2 gene; 2, PB1 gene; 3, PA gene; 5, NP gene; 7, M gene; 8, NS gene. All branch lengths are scaled
according to the number of substitutions per site.
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lineage A/H7N9 viruses clustered into Clade C-1. The ancestor
of the HA gene of YRD-lineage HP A/H7N9 seems to have origi-
nated from third wave viruses that spread to Guangdong in
early 2015 (Fig. 4, Supplementary Figs S1 and S3). We found that
virus isolates from eastern China and Guangdong in the fourth
wave were at the root of clade C-1, suggesting that this clade
possibly originated from eastern China (Fig. 4, Supplementary
Fig. S1).
The comparison of genotypes identified a total of 180 geno-
types (G1–G180) from the first wave to the fifth epidemic A/
H7N9 wave (Supplementary Fig. S2). A total of ffifty-nine geno-
types were detected in the fifth wave in China, of which nine-
teen genotypes were HP (Supplementary Fig. S2), and forty
genotypes were LP, reflecting the widespread evolution of these
viruses. Of the nineteen genotypes of HP, 15, 5, 2, and 2 geno-
types were found in Guangdong, Eastern China, Central China,
and other regions, respectively. The most prevalent genotype
G108 (83/125; 66%) was detected across China (Supplementary
Fig. S2). Twelve of the fourteen other genotypes found in our
Guangdong dataset are unique to Guangdong (Supplementary
Fig. S2). Genotypes 113, 114, 119, and 126 were uniquely
detected in other regions of China. Most HP A/H7N9 genotypes
in Guangdong reassorted with NA and six internal genes of
newly introduced YRD-lineage LP, local PRD-lineage LP, and lo-
cal A/H9N2 viruses (Fig. 4). Our genome analysis confirmed the
diversity of A/H7N9 viruses and its continuing diversification by
genetic reassortment.
3.4 Reassortment history
To clarify the mechanism behind the genotype diversity of LP
and HP A/H7N9 in Guangdong, the internal genes of the viruses
within each HA clade were further analyzed. During the fifth
wave, three H7N9 lineages were co-circulating in Guangdong:
the local LP PRD lineage (13%), the newly imported LP YRD line-
age (23%), and HP YRD lineage (64%). Strikingly, in addition to
the PRD-lineage LP viruses, a diverse range of YRD-lineage LP A/
H7N9 viruses were found during the fifth wave (Fig. 3), which
strongly suggests that these were newly introduced from other
provinces. Moreover, in the fifth wave, the six internal genes of
PRD-lineage A/H7N9 viruses in Guangdong seem to be replaced
by those of YRD-lineage A/H7N9 viruses (Fig. 3). Most viruses, in-
cluding PRD-lineage A/H7N9 viruses, contained descendants of
internal genes of YRD-lineage A/H7N9, while none of the local
LPM and human A/H7N9 viruses inherited all six internal gene
segments from PRD-lineage A/H7N9. In the beginning of the
fifth wave, HP A/H7N9 viruses acquired PB2 and M gene seg-
ments from clade 2, and had PB1, PA, NP, and NS gene segments
of clade 1 (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. S1). The later spread of this
virus to different regions in Guangdong led to occasionally re-
placement of six internal genes by clade 1 PB2 or by clade 2 PB1,
PA, NP, and NS genes, or by clade 3 PB1, NP, and NS genes. Thus,
current HP A/H7N9 was a result of extensive reassortment of in-
troduced YRD-lineage A/H7N9, local PRD-lineage A/H7N9, and
A/H9N2 viruses (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. S1).
Figure 5. Distribution of the seven different motifs on HA cleavage sites of HP A/H7N9 viruses in Guangdong province for environmental and human isolates. Different
motifs were highlighted with different colors. The number of variants detected in human and environment were represented by the scales of circle and column,
respectively.
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Table 2. Amino acid substitutions of HP A/H7N9 viruses from humans and LPMs.
No. (%) of viral isolates from
Human HPAI H7N9 Environmental HPAI H7N9
Segments Amino acid substitution V1 Total V1 V3 Total
HAa G186V/N/K I 3 (6.7) 3 (6.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
G186V/N/K V 42 (93.3) 45 (93.8) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
K193T K 45 (100) 48 (100) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
N224K N 45 (100) 48 (100) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
Q226L H 2 (4.4) 2 (4.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Q226L L 2 (4.4) 2 (4.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Q226L Q 41 (91.1) 44 (91.7) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
G228S G 45 (100) 48 (100) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
NAa E119V E 45 (100) 47 (97.9) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
E119V V 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
A246T A 45 (100) 48 (100) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
H274Y H 44 (97.8) 47 (97.9) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
H274Y Y 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
R292K R 31 (68.9) 34 (70.8) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
R292K K 13 (28.9) 13 (27.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
R292K X 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
PB2b A199S A 42 (95.5) 44 (95.7) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
A199S T 2 (4.5) 2 (4.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
T271A T 43 (97.7) 45 (97.8) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
T271A A 1 (2.3) 1 (2.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
K526R K 17 (38.6) 17 (37) 5 (13.9) 6 (37.5) 13 (22.4)
K526R R 27 (61.4) 29 (63) 31 (86.1) 10 (62.5) 45 (77.5)
M535L M 17 (38.6) 17 (37) 5 (13.9) 6 (37.5) 13 (22.4)
M535L L 27 (61.4) 29 (63) 31 (86.1) 10 (62.5) 45 (77.6)
A588V A 26 (59.1) 27 (58.7) 30 (83.3) 11 (68.8) 45 (77.6)
A588V I 2 (4.5) 2 (4.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
A588V T 2 (4.5) 2 (4.3) 1 (2.8) 0 (0) 1 (1.7)
A588V V 14 (31.8) 15 (32.6) 5 (13.9) 5 (31.3) 12 (20.7)
Q591K Q 46 (104.5) 46 (100) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
Q591K K 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
E627K E 26 (59.1) 26 (56.5) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
E627K K 14 (31.8) 16 (34.8) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
E627K X 4 (9.1) 4 (8.7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
D701N D 36 (81.8) 38 (82.6) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
D701N N 7 (15.9) 7 (15.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
D701N X 1 (2.3) 1 (2.2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
K702R K 35 (79.5) 37 (80.4) 31 (86.1) 16 (100) 51 (87.9)
K702R R 9 (20.5) 9 (19.6) 5 (13.9) 0 (0) 7 (12.1)
PB1c I368V I 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1.7)
I368V L 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
I368V V 43 (95.6) 45 (95.7) 36 (100) 16 (100) 56 (96.6)
PAc V100A A 23 (51.1) 24 (51.1) 28 (77.8) 11 (68.8) 43 (74.1)
V100A V 22 (48.9) 23 (48.9) 7 (19.4) 5 (31.3) 14 (24.1)
V100A T 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2.8) 0 (0) 1 (1.7)
A404S A 43 (95.6) 45 (95.7) 35 (97.2) 15 (93.8) 56 (96.6)
A404S S 2 (4.4) 2 (4.3) 1 (2.8) 1 (6.3) 2 (3.4)
S409N S 3 (6.7) 3 (6.4) 3 (8.3) 3 (18.8) 6 (10.3)
S409N N 42 (93.3) 44 (93.6) 33 (91.7) 13 (81.3) 52 (89.7)
NPc V33I V 43 (95.6) 45 (95.7) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
V33I I 2 (4.4) 2 (4.3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
I109V I 45 (100) 46 (97.9) 36 (100) 16 (100) 56 (96.6)
I109V V 0 (0) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (3.4)
M1c P41A A 44 (97.8) 46 (97.9) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
P41A S 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
T215A A 45 (100) 47 (100) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
V115I V 44 (97.8) 46 (97.9) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
V115I I 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
M2c S31N N 45 (100) 47 (100) 36 (100) 15 (93.8) 57 (98.3)
S31N S 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (6.3) 1 (1.7)
(continued)
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3.5 Analysis of HP A/H7N9 genomes for biologically
relevant mutations
Six HA cleavage site amino acid motifs have been described, in-
cluding PKRKRTAR#G (V1), PKGKRTKR#G (V2), PKGKRTAR#G
(V3), PKGKRIAR#G (V4), PKRRRTAR#G (V5), and PKRKRAAR#G
(V6). In the present study, we identified a novel motif
‘PKRKRIAR#G0 and defined it as V7. Moreover, variants 1, 2, 3,
and 5 were also found in the present study. Analysis based on
all publicly available HP A/H7N9 and those in the present study
showed that most human HP A/H7N9 viruses contain the V1
motif. Variant 1 HP A/H7N9 was found in 93.7 per cent (45/48) of
human cases, variants 3, 5, and 6 accounted for 2 per cent (1/48)
each. In LPMs’ surveillance samples, variants 1 and 3 accounted
for 49.6 per cent (57/115) and 43.4 per cent (50/115) of positive
samples, and variants 2, 5, and 7 accounted for 3.5 per cent (4/
115), 1.7 per cent (2/115), and 1.7 per cent (2/115), respectively.
V1 was widely distributed in the north, east, west and center of
Guangdong, while V2–V7 only circulated in the center and east
of Guangdong (Fig. 5). The human cases were mainly detected in
central, northern, and eastern Guangdong (Fig. 5).
Amino acid substitutions of human and environmental HP
A/H7N9 were analyzed and compared (H3 numbering), with an
emphasis on variants V1 and V3. Many amino acid substitutions
that may be relevant for risk assessment were found both in hu-
man and environmental HP A/H7N9, which include G186V on
the HA gene, K526R, A588V, and K702R on the PB2 gene, V100A,
A402S, and S409N on the PA gene, S31N of M2 gene, N205S on
the NS1 gene, and T48A on the NS2 gene (Table 2). Moreover,
some amino acid substitutions were exclusively found in hu-
man HP A/H7N9, including G186I, Q226H, and Q226L on the HA
gene, E119V, R292K, and R292X on the NA gene, A199S, T271A,
A588I, E627K, E627X, D701N, and D701X on the PB2 gene, I368L
on the PB1 gene, V33I on the NP gene, P41A on the M1 gene, and
P42S on the NS1 gene (Table 2).
4. Discussion
The fifth epidemic wave of avian influenza A/H7N9 started in
September 2016 with a sudden increase of human cases in
seven provinces (Su et al. 2017). The first HP A/H7N9 was
detected retrospectively on four markets in Heyuan, Guangdong
province in November 2016, before the notification of the first
case of human HP A/H7N9 infection in December 2016 (Ke et al.
2017). HP A/H7N9 was later also identified in other patients in
the PRD Region, as well as the eastern and northern areas of
Guangdong.
Since the first detection of HP A/H7N9 in four cities of
Guangdong province, it was detected in nineteen cities in
Guangdong and eleven other provinces in China. Analysis based
on the HA gene suggested that HP A/H7N9 originated from the
Guangdong and eastern China. It seems that HP A/H7N9 viruses
spread from Guangdong to other regions (Fig. 3). This might
have been due to market closure, which may have led to a shift
in the market through retailers selling their live poultry in other
regions or neighboring provinces (Wu et al. 2016). Genotype
comparison demonstrated that, although Guangdong province
accounted for 79 per cent of HP genotypes in the fifth wave,
most HP genotypes are unique to Guangdong province. This
suggests limited outward spread of HP A/H7N9 viruses. The re-
verse was true for LP, for which genome analysis revealed novel
imported H7N9 viruses into Guangdong. Further analysis of six
internal genes showed that the internal genes of HP A/H7N9 vi-
ruses have multiple origins, with internal gene segments from
YRD-lineage H7N9 viruses from fourteen different provinces
across the whole wave, which is consistent with the massive
poultry import into Guangdong (Li et al. 2018). These imported
LP viruses seemed to have an advantage as almost all internal
segments of local PRD-lineage LP/H7N9 viruses were replaced
by those of YRD-lineage H7N9 viruses. Our study suggests that
live poultry trade is a key driver of genetic heterogeneity of HP
H7N9 and LP H7N9 in Guangdong.
Seven different cleavage site variants (V1–V7) were identified
in Guangdong in the fifth wave outbreak (Qi et al. 2018; Quan
et al. 2018; Shi et al. 2018). Comparing these cleavage site motifs
between human A/H7 viruses and those detected on LPMs,
showed a difference in distribution of variants between LPMs
and humans, suggesting V1 cleavage site may increase the rep-
lication in poultry. The high viral load makes the virus more
readily transmit from birds to humans. It has been described
that different cleavage site motifs can contribute to variations
in virulence in HP avian influenza viruses in different
hosts(Zhang et al. 2012). However, further research is needed to
determine their influence on human pathogenicity and viru-
lence. In addition, we found several mutations that have been
described as potentially increasing the risk of pathogenicity and
transmission in humans. A G186V amino acid substitution in
the HA gene was found in 100 per cent of environmental HP A/
H7N9 viruses in the present study, implying an increased viral
affinity to the human-type receptor (Chen et al. 2016). Although
mutations on E627K and D701N in PB2 gene were not found in
environmental HP A/H7N9, mutations K526R and M535L were
found in 77.5 per cent environmental HP A/H7N9 viruses, which
Table 2. Continued
No. (%) of viral isolates from
Human HPAI H7N9 Environmental HPAI H7N9
Segments Amino acid substitution V1 Total V1 V3 Total
NS1 c P42S S 44 (97.8) 46 (97.9) 36 (100) 16 (100) 58 (100)
P42S A 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
N205S S 44 (97.8) 46 (97.9) 36 (100) 15 (93.8) 57 (98.3)
N205S I 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 1 (6.3) 1 (1.7)
NS2c T48A A 44 (97.8) 46 (97.9) 36 (100) 15 (93.8) 57 (98.3)
T48A S 1 (2.2) 1 (2.1) 0 (0) 1 (6.3) 1 (1.7)
aVariant 1, n¼45; HP human cases, n¼48.
bVariant 1, n¼44; HP human cases, n¼ 46
cVariant 1, n¼45; HP human cases, n¼47.






/ve/article/6/2/veaa097/6041617 by guest on 11 February 2021
indicated a potential enhanced virulence in mammalians (Chen
et al. 2016). Mutations associated with host transmission (avian
to human) were also found in the PB2 gene (12%) and the PA
gene (74%–90%) in environmental HP A/H7N9. Moreover, 99 per
cent of environment HP A/H7N9 acquired S31N on M2 gene,
N205S on NS1, T48A on NS2, which reportedly reduces suscepti-
bility to rimantadine and amantadine and alter the antiviral re-
sponse in the hosts (Chen et al. 2016). The potential
consequences of these different mutations of HP A/H7N9 virus
need further investigation.
Our study was done retrospectively, but showed potential
for early warning for vaccine escape variants or circulation of vi-
ruses with molecular markers for human infections or antiviral
resistance (Bai 2019). With the development of next-generation
sequencing, such public health translation of pathogen genomic
data can become a new routine, provided costs of sequencing
and analytical processes is developed for such environments
(Aarestrup and Koopmans 2016; Grubaugh et al. 2019). This
includes infrastructure for sharing of relevant data, even before
public release (Amid 2019).
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Virus Evolution online.
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